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Plaintiff-Respondent 
-V-
ANGELO FERNANDO QUEVEDO, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 19049 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, ANGELO FERNANDO QUEVEDO, was 
charged by Information with the crimes of Aggravated 
Robbery in Count I and Count II, First Degree Felonys 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). 
Trial was held in the Third Judicial District Court on 
February 16 and 17, 1983, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, ANGELO FERNANDO QUEVEDO, was tried 
and convicted in a jury trial of two Counts of Aggravated 
0 obtary, A First Degree Felony in ?iolatian of Utah Code 
Ann. as amended', and was sentenced to 
incarceration at the Jtah State Prison for the undeterminate 
provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reveral ·Jf t _ r i r : 
judgement rendered below, anl be •r"t. 
upon a finding of insu!'c'icienc:; ·Jf the '· :11 
the alternative, appellant seeks to have ohe remaniel 
for a new trial upon a finding of error on 
Point. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 5, 1983, at 9:00 in the evening, 
two masked men entered the Triangle Oil Company outlet 
at 2700 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, and with the 
aid of a pistol robbed the atteniant ef cash and his watch. 
(T. 14) 
Some eighteen minutes later, the same two masked 
men robbed the attendant of a Chem Oil store located at 
502 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City. The same weapon 
was used again. (T. 25) On the basis of a citizen's report 
a blue Chevrolet was observed with three individuals in 
the same area. (T. 41, 59) This vehicle attempted to 
elude the police, resulting in the suspect blue Chevrolet 
coming to a sudden stop and three individuals sprinting 
away. (T. 64) The two who exited the passenger siJe •,iere 
apprehended and were an·j sent:Pn'P·J t',ec 
robberies. 
Joseph Vigil and Leonarrj "li5il 1:-1J i 
to name the who was driving 
-2-
Th"' Qxited suspect blue Chevrolet on 
l'h"C: 'l' e entere•j an apartment building located 
at Jouth 4CO Sast, Jalt Lake City, and talked to 
several people, one of whom was Linda Vigil in apartment 
5A, questioning them as to whether they had seen a Tongan 
running through the building. (T. 234) Some time later, 
the police returned to apartment 5A and again spoke to 
Miss Vigil. She let them in and the following search 
revealed the petitioner in bed with Yolanda Vigil in a 
back bedroom. (T. 222) 
At the trial the defense put on three witnesses. 
Joseph Vigil, one of the convicted robbers in this case 
testified that the third person, the driver, was not 
the defendant; and further, that the driver had not run 
toward the apartment house where the defendant was found. 
(T. 201-205) 
Yolanda Pauline Vigil and Lisa Burkhard, who 
were in the apartment where the defendant was found 
testified that the appellant, Angelo Fernando Quevedo had 
been in the apartment for some time in bed with Yolanda 
"/igil. (T. :?IS, 231) 
ARG"JMS!IT 
T!-!E E"/IDE?!CE PRESE:•JTED BY THE STATE WAS 
INSUFFICISNT TO SSTABLISH THE GUILT OF 
C'HE APPSLLA:JT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
-3-
The driver exited t:--:e ;:2 ,.;.-=· 
located at 837 South 
The police t.i'. l ' -11r _l_ l. 
several people, one of whom was 
them as to whether they had seen a Tong'lr: r'1nn' rh· 
the building. (T. 234) Some time later, tree pol:'..:ce 
returned to apartment SA and again spoke 7igil. 
She let them in and the following search revealed the 
petitioners in bed with Yolanda Vigil in a back bedroom. 
(T. 222) 
At the trial the defense put on three witnesses. 
Joseph Vigil, one of the convicted robbers in this case, 
testified that the third person, the driver, was not the 
defendant; and further, that the driver had not run toward 
the apartment house where the defendant was found. 
(T. 201-205) 
Yolanda Pauline Vigil and Lisa Burkhard, who 
were in the apartment where the defendant was found testified 
that the appellant, Angelo Quevedo 
been in the apartment for some time in bed with Yolanda 
Vigil. (T. 218, 231) 
ARGUMENT 
?IJI:TT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTE'.:: BY 
INSUFFICIEiJT TIJ 2:3TABLCH 
THE APPELLA:JT BE"Ic:rc: A "\SA 
well that a reviewing court has 
3. cas"=' on sufficiency of the 
for review was clearly stated in 
'" ·1 . ·ti i ls on, 5 6 5 P . 2 d 6 6 ( 19 7 7 ) : 
In order for the defendant to success-
fully challenge and overturn a verdict on 
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, 
it must appear that upon so viewing the evi-
dence, reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime. 565 P. 2d 68. 
See Also State v. Fort, 572 P. 2d 1387. 
In State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (1975), this 
court also addressed when sufficiency of the evidence 
must be challenged: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain his conviction, it must appear 
that viewing the evidence and all interferences 
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury, reasonable minds could not 
believe him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 530 P. 2d at 1272. 
This Court in the recent past has recognized 
the duty of a reviewing court to review a case on the 
sufficiency of the evidence where the issue is properly 
presented. Most recently this Court in State v. Petree, 
659 P. 2d 443 (Utah 1983) stated: 
Considering that question [W]e 
review the evijence and all inferences 
which rc;etsonabl.'f be drawn from it 
in the most 2 avorable to the verdict 
(Jf t:hc 1/Je the jury conviction 
for evidence only when the 
evidence so viewed is sufficiently incon-
2lusive or inherently impallatable 
that reasonable minds must 
a reasonable doubt that the 
committed the f,Jr 
convicted. 659 P. 2d at 4:14. 
See also, State v. Linden, 6S7 P. 2cJ 1367 (;;ta!1 · , 
State v. Mccardle, 652 P. 2d 942 (Utah 1982); 3tate 
Howell, 649 P. 2d 91 (Utah 1982); 3tate v. Y.erekes, 
622 P. 2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, appellant contends that there was 
sufficient evidence of him being elsewhere and thus a 
reasonable doubt is raised. In State v. Meacham, 455 
P. 2d 156 (1969) the Court specifically addresses this: 
... it is nevertheless the burden of the 
State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt; and if the evidence of 
the defendant's being elsewhere is suf-
ficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
his being involved in the crime, he should 
be aquitted. 455 P. 2d at 158. 
See also State v. Wilson, 565 P. 2d (1977) 66 at 68 
which again addresses this issue: 
The burden is upon the State to prove his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and if 
the evidence with respect to any defense, 
e.g., in this instance alibi, is sufficient 
to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted. 
Appellant contends that the evidence introduced by 
the State at trial is in light 0f tta jafense 
testimony which established that the defendant had 
his girlfriend prior to his arrest and not with the 
robbers. (T. 201, 218, 231) From the 
re -_,-
i+, i:c important to point out that this 
1 '"-nt >:ise, !':elJ that it is sufficient for 
evidence or lack thereof creates a 
as to any element of the crime. (State 
v. Torres, 61? P. 2d 695). Here, it is respectfully 
submitted by the appellant, through his defense testimony 
that he has met the standard of reasonable doubt. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
At trial defense counsel proferred the following 
Instruction to the Court. That Instruction provided in 
part: 
In appraising the identification 
testimony of a witness, you should 
consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the 
witness had the capacity and an 
adequate opportunity to observe 
the of fender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate 
to observe the person at 
the time will be affected by such 
matters as how long or short a time 
was available to observe the offender, 
how or :lase the witness was from 
the how good lighting 
·"1hetf-:PY' ':ht> 1.vitness had had 
the person in 
.._ h>? ;:ao t. 
-t:-
(2) Are you satisfied that tre 
identification made by ':hat 
subsequent to the event was a 
of her own m3y 
take into account bnth the stren;;"!1 
of the identifi,;ation, and the 
circumstances under which the ijen':i-
fication was made. 
If the identification by the 
may have been influenced by tr.e '2 irc1im-
stances under which the defendant was 
presented to her for identification, 
you should scrutinize the identification 
with great care. You may also consider 
the length of time that lapsed between 
the occurrence of the crime and the 
next opportunity of the witness to 
see or hear the defendant, as a 
factor bearing on the reliability of 
the identification. 
(3) Finally, you must consider 
the credibility of each identification 
witness in the same way as any other 
witness; consider whether she is truth-
ful, and consider whether she had the 
capacity and opportunity to make a 
reliable observation on the matter 
covered in her testimony. 
The burden of proof on the State 
extends to every element of the offense 
and the identity of the perpetrator 
is such an element. The State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Angelo Fernando Quevedo was the perpetrator 
of the offense. If after examining 
the testimony you have a reasonable 
doubt as to the accuracy of the identi-
fication, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
The trial court refused to give the instruction as 
and exception was taken. (T. 
The dangers inherent in ey 0 w:tness ijc,,,':':': i 
evidence have been the subject of . r 
In an oft-quoted passage, the late Folix Frankfurtor, 
-1-
>fr, l L l :- ' ''' "' (, ) : id en t if i ,cat ion 
·"=r. 
3+-r2ngers is 
:1_:._ l./ ru3 .... >10rt::hy. "rhe 
3.re estab-
lished by a fJrmijable number of 
instances in the resords of English 
and American trials. These instances 
are recent -- not due to the brutalities 
of ancient sriminal procedure ... 
Evidence as to identity based on 
personal impressions, however bona fide, 
is perhaps of all classes of evidence 
the lease to be relied upon, and 
therefore, unless supported by other 
facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict 
of a jury. Frankfurter, Trial of 
Sacco and Vanzetti. 
The unreliability of eyewitness identification 
has been well documented in the literature and law review 
articles have been written on the subject in recent years. 1 
The commentators note that reasons for this unreliability 
are found in the problems that are associated with human 
perception and memory, both of which play a vital role in 
eyewitness identification. A lengthy discussion of these 
problems are found in a law review article dealing with 
1. Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological 
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 
29 Stan. L. Rev. 3b9 11917); Process Standards for the 
Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. 
L. Eev. 4t·l \ Ideni:-i:'ication Evidence: --
:;,-:-', - . .:i'=-'r W.'.:)';' 71')80); Ellis, 
[.J_'Jies, 3her:Y1>=';'1, -?S Identification, 
:lat. T. 'ri"1. ·:" 'i - - :-oice Identification 
in '"'' ' 1 ,, .•.'"' :J ::'1e Federal Rules of 
4J =-.·1w s.1: 73. 
the problems of perception and mgmor; 
? 
with hearsa; testimon;.- · 
the author noted: 
At a basic level 
by objective structural f:i·ctClr::; 
as the nature of the stimulus, thµ impad-
of the stimulus in the sense 
according to various physical laws, 
the operation of afferent neural pathwa;s 
from the sense organs to the brain, and 
the cortical projection or reconstructi::;n 
of the stimulus. However, the neurological 
system operates to transduce physical energy 
into a sensation, it is clear that inter-
pretation is required to transform sensation 
into meaning. (Emphasis Added) 
* * * 
In organizing raw sensory input, the 
central nervous system is not a photograph 
recorder. . Injury, pathology, drugs, 
youth and senility can seriously impair 
the accuracy of these processes. 1970 
Utah Law. Rev. at 9. 
In United States v. Barber, 412 F. 2d 517 (3rd 
Cir. 1971), the court gave a similar description of :he 
processes involved in human observation, perception and 
memory. It then went on to state, with respect to eye-
witness identification: 
Eyewitness identification testimony, therefore, 
is an expression of a belief or impression by 
the witness. If there is a high degree of 
precision and certainty in his expressicn, 
2. Stewart, Perception, and "earsa·1; T1:· 
of Present Law and the ?reposed Fejera: ?u 1 es 
1970 Utah Law Rev. 1. 
-j-
r :_ t ; , · 
which is :onsistent with any prior statements 
anj on cross-examination, the 
s:atpm 0 nt Jf witness may be regarded 
as ' o: fact. If certainty is 
expression is deemed to possess 
an quality of inferior rank. 
where the circumstances surrounding 
the criminal act gave limited opportunity 
for observation or utilization of the 
sensory perception, or where uncertainty 
is expressed by the witness himself, or 
exposed by a past history of the witness' 
statements or demonstrated by cross-examination, 
the statement of identity should be considered 
as only an expression of opinion and should 
be accompanied by appropriate instructions 
as to its sufficiency and weight. To be 
sure, the courts have been generous in 
the admission of eyewitness identification 
in order to permit the jury to make its 
own assessment. The emphasis has been on 
inclusion of evidence, rather than exclusion; 
on credibility, rather than admissibility. 
[footnotes omitted] (Emphasis added) 412 F. 
2d at 527. 
In the instant case, the identification evidence 
is based upon the unreliable representations of officers due 
to the heat of the chase, and in less than ideal lighting. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Warren, 
635 P. 2d 1263 (Kan. 1981), discussed the problems which 
are associated with the use of identification evidence. 
The court then took note of the particular problems that 
arise in the courtroom with that evidence. 
In spite of the great volume of articles 
on the subject of eyewitness testimony 
by legal writers and the great deal of 
by rsychologists in 
this country 
[-:.:1'!'? .cl :3-k>? t'.le problem 
'1ntil have not 
takan affective steps to confront it. 
The trouble is that many judges have 
assumed that an ''eyeball" witness, who 
identifies the accused as 
is the most reli3ble of •• 
if there are ar.y quest i n.; ".· ·> · 
identification, t:hr=> j11r 1Jr.:J, >-;;,":r· ':Ji , , 
are fully capable·)'.' ·r,·· 
credibility of the witness .. 
instructions from the 2•iurt. ·1et .; 
of mistaken identification arg not 
infrequent and the problem of misi·Jenti-
fication has not been alleviated. 
The Kansas procedure does provide certain 
safeguards to prevent the conviction of 
an innocent accused on the basis of 
unreliable eyewitness identification. 
Our trial courts have the power to 
suppress eyewitness testimony, if the 
eyewitness identification procedure 
rendered the testimony unreliable. 
Cross-examination and argument by defense 
counsel afford some protection. Unfor-
tunately, these procedures have not 
solved the problem. Able defense 
counsel have attempted to combat unreliable 
eyewitness identification by two additional 
methods: They have called to the witness 
stand expert witnesses in the field of 
psychology to testify as to the various 
factors which may cause eyewitness 
identification to be unreliable. They 
have also requested the trial court to 
give a cautionary instruction stating 
the factors to be considered by the jury 
in weighing the credibility of eyewitness 
testimony. 635 P. 2d at 1241. 
In Warren, the trial court refused to allow the defense to 
take either of these actions. The defendant's expert on 
eyewitness identification, was not allowed to testify 
and the court refused to give the same instruction as 
appellant requested in the instant case. Aft er a le ngt 
discussion on the use of expert testimony • ;. sol"Je !:lie 
problems associated with the eyewitness 
Kansas Court stated: 
-11-
3',;.b ·11e r.a·re 
evidence 
l: .. :·tJ;;;;r ':h>-? problem. •t1e 
r_,,_. 1.i·:·1":" pr0t::"='m can be allevi-
tv orcp 0 r instruction 
which sets forth the factors 
to be in evaluating eyewitness 
3·1ch an instruction, coupled 
·,.;i ':t: ·1is'Jr0u.s and 
persua3ive argument by defense counsel 
dealing realistically with the short-
and trouble spots of the identi-
fication process, should protect the rights 
of the defendant and at the same time enable 
the courts to avoid the problems involved in 
the admission of expert testimony on this 
iJ:?C: P. 2d 1243. 
The instruction that the Kansas Court held should 
ce gi·1en was ':hat framed by the United States Court of 
Appeal for the District of Columbia in United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F. 2d 552 (D.C. Cir., 1972). 3 The Telfaire 
court described the need for such an instruction stating: 
The presumption of innocence that 
safeguards the common law system must 
be a premise that is realized in 
instruction and not merely a promise. 
In pursuance of that objective, we 
have pointed out the importance of 
and need fer special instruction on 
the key issue identification, which 
emphasi=es the jury the need for 
finding that the circumstances of the 
identification are convincing beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This need was 
voiced !n 1142 in McKenzie v. Cnited 
3tatr?:::, '" 1 :;-i __,,.. .1-r,j it r.as 
wcs with approval by Justice 
··e rinian in State v. Malmrose, 649 
and as requested by appellant in 
following: 
been given vitality in our opi ions Jf 
recent years -- following the 
Court's 1966 Wade-Gilbert v. alif 
3 8 8 u . s . 2 6 3 ' j 7 s . t . 1 l ' l . ,j . 
2d 1178 (1967) Stovall ·1. [enn0, :c.J 
U.S. 293 trilogy focusing on very 
real danger of mistaken 
as a threat to justice. We refer 
our post-Wade opinions in Gregory v. 
United States, 369 F. 2d 185 (10661 and 
Macklin v. United States, 409 F. 2d 174 
(1969). These opinions sought to take 
into account the traditional recognition 
that identification testimony presents 
special problems of reliability by 
stressing the importance of an identifi-
cation instruction even in cases meeting 
the constitutional threshold of admissibility. 
[footnotes omitted] 469 F. 2d at 555. 
The appeals court then went on to hold the 
... we have considered the fact that trial 
courts are often required to determine the 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony where 
issues of unreliability are raised. As 
pointed out by Chief Justice Schroeder in 
State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 608 P. 2d 
946, in testing the reliability of 
identification testimony, the five 
factors mentioned in Neil v. Biggers 
[490 U.S. 188 (1972)] should be considered 
by the trial court. If these five factors 
should be considered in determining the 
admissibility of the testimony, it would 
seem even more appropriate to require the 
jury to consider the same factors in weighing 
the credibility of the eyewitness identifi-
cation testimony. Otherwise the jury might 
reasonably conclude that the admission of 
the evidence the trial court vouched for 
its reliability. We think it clear that, 
in order to prevent potential injustice, 
some standards must be provided the 
so that the credibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony can be intel!igant:; 
and fairly weighed. giving of such an 
instruction will take only a couple of 
minutes in trial time and will be WP!l 
-13-
.!I +-, 
'i ',' l p ] • 
future injustices can be 
i at 1244 by 
-· c ·1,; i_ 'J11r:iLcer of other juris-
3tatces •1. Telf2iree, s11ora, shoulj be given when 1;1arranted 
by circur:istances of 3- particular case.
4 
This court has addressed this issue several times. 
While this court has not held in the past that such an 
instruction was required, has never held that the 
giving of such an instruction would be error. State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P. 2j 56 ('Jtah l'.)82); State v. Schaffer, 
638 P. 2d 1135 ('Jtah 1921). In State v. Mccumber, 622 
P. 2d 353 (Utah 1980 ), the issue of the refusal to give 
an instruction on eyewitness identification was raised; 
with respect to that issue this court stated: 
A criminal defendant is entitled to 
have a jury instructed on his theory 
of the case if there is any substantial 
evidence to justify such an instruction. 
Where, however, the requested instruction 
is denied, no prejudicial error occurs if 
it appears that the giving of the requested 
instruction would not have affected the 
outcome of the trial. Moreover, a defendant 
is not entitled to an instruction which is 
redundant or repetitive of principles 
enunciated in other instructions given 
;>e<:'.Jmmeride 1 l )r 
3-S r"?fl'?''-.+-.=::.,l t·,' rf 
F. '.__)•-:, 
F. ::'j -;SD 1 -:'th cJ , 
"'62 (Conn. S:at:e ·1. 
1')'73), jen. 1J.S. 
:'_as been either 
__ n ..... j'J.Y'isdictions 
Jnited States v. Holly 
; States v. Hodges, 515 
3tate -1. Benjamin, 363 A. 2d 
514 P. 2d 1354 (Or. App. 
1974). 
-l4-
to the jury. The prinsioal 
defendant's proposed instrq2t i )n 1· 
with the State's an! 
the factors to consider in 
the testimony of an °yewitnes3. He. 
of these factors 
with in other instructions 
to the jury by the trial court. As 
a result, we cannot agree that the denial 
of the proposed instruction constituted 
reversible error. [footnote omitted= 
6 2 2 P. 2d at 3 5 9. 
In the instant case, it is important to note 
the general instruction on the presumption of innocence and 
burden of proof do not alleviate the prejudice in refusing 
to instruct the jury with respect to the inherent dangers 
of eyewitness and voice identification. This court has 
held that a jury need not ". . go through such a tortuous 
process when that result could have been achieved by giving 
the defendant's requested instruction, or one of that 
substance." State v. Torres, 619 P. 2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980). 
The giving of an instruction similar to that 
requested by the appellant would achieve in a straight 
forward manner the necessary function of informing the jury 
upon the dangers inherent in identification testimony. 
Further, such an instruction would have fairly stated the 
theory of the defense. It would appear that the giving 
of such an instruction would be neither illegal, unconsti-
tutional or unfair, rather policy and fairness dictatP 
giving such an instruction. 
The circumstances surrounding the iiPntificatiJn 
at the time of the arrest and chase made for a highly 
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;nrpli3tle Further, the use of identification 
·.:· ;nrlC?l' give rise to a large amount 
:f EvC?n if this court were not to hold that a 
type instruction must be given in all cases, it was 
certainly necessary in this case. 
In the instant case, and in similar cases where 
the instruction is not given, the defense is placed in 
the position of mixing elements of argument with sound 
principles of law and policy as though the whole were 
argument. Basic fundamentals of the nature of identification 
testimony, as with other instructions on the law are to be 
applied to the facts in argument. It is the role of the 
judge to separate argument from legal principle, as is 
done in cases where alibi or other legal issues are raised. 
If the defense attorney is required to place those principles 
before the jury as part of argument without an instruction, 
the jury cannot, and will not separate the two. 
A criminal conviction must be reversed if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would be different 
if the requested instruction had been given. State v. Mitcheson, 
560 P. 2d 1120 (Utah 1977). Appellant respectfully submits 
that had the jury had the opportunity to consider the 
evidence in light of instruction, a different result 
wo11lrJ hJ.'Je bPen )br 'liw•,j. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the appellant was 
through the testimony of sever2l officers who, at 
times, described different individuals as the appellant. 
Based upon the prejudicial failure to give appellant's 
Instruction and insufficiency of the evidence as discussed 
above, appellant respectfully requests the above requested 
relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
j/ 
this_'::..' day of Ma?{h, 
A. 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this ; 0 day 
of March, 1984. 
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